PK v Cardiff Council

Jonathan Lindfield,  instructed by Judith Blades at Dolmans, has successfully defended Cardiff Dogs Home (“CDH”), which is operated by Cardiff Council, against an action brought against it pursuant to the Animals Act 1971 and in common law negligence.

CDH is a large dogs home which takes in dogs from various backgrounds, looks after them, and rehomes them. As part of their activities, CDH invite volunteers, both private and corporate groups, to walk their dogs for them. It was in the context of a volunteer from a corporate group walking a dog that the incident which was the subject of the claim occurred.

On 21 November 2023, a volunteer on behalf of CDH was walking a 7-year-old Staffordshire Bull Terrier called Champ, who had originally been taken in as a stray in June of that year, along the Ely Trail in South Wales. This is a narrow path frequently used by dog walkers. As the volunteer was walking along the trail with Champ, the Claimant was coming the other way, walking his own dog, also a Staffordshire Bull Terrier. The Claimant’s dog was a much younger puppy.

The Claimant’s evidence, which was accepted at trial, was that the volunteer was asked whether the dogs were okay to “say hello” to each other, and that the volunteer said that it was. As the dogs came close together, Champ suddenly attacked the Claimant’s dog, biting its head and not letting go. Seeking to protect his dog, the Claimant intervened, suffering a fractured index finger and soft tissue damage to his wrist in the process. The Claimant’s case was that his hand was caught up and/or crushed in the leads in attempting to separate the dogs.

The Defendant’s policy for its dog walkers (described as the “Golden Rule”) was not to allow any interaction between dogs. Volunteers were instructed not to let CDH’s dogs come into any contact with other dogs, and to turn around, walk the other way, and tell people not to approach if they were so approached. CDH’s evidence was that it drilled this into its volunteers and gave them a full briefing before sending them out dog walking. It was conceded at trial that the volunteer did not follow this guidance as given to them by the Defendant, but it was maintained that it was not negligent to have allowed the dogs to interact owing to a lack of foreseeable risk.

There was also a dispute on the evidence as to how the Claimant came to sustain his injury. The Claimant pleaded and instructed his medical expert that it was sustained by his finger and wrist becoming caught up in the dogs’ leads as the attack occurred and/or whilst attempting to separate the dogs. The Defendant’s case was that the Claimant punched Champ in the head, which was the likely cause of his injury. At trial, the Claimant maintained that his injury was caused by the lead, but did concede that he had punched Champ repeatedly during the incident.

The Court did not hear evidence from the volunteer, who was unfortunately not traceable.

After a 1-day trial in the Cardiff County Court, Judgment was reserved and handed down on 28 May 2025. At the handing down hearing, an ex-tempore Judgment from the District Judge dismissed the Claimant’s claim in its entirety.

The Animals Act

The Claimant’s claim failed under the Act for several reasons, but principally because the Judge found that Champ did not have the pleaded characteristics of become aggressive and/or having a tendency to bite when highly stimulated in the presence of other dogs. He found that Champ was not displaying aggressive behaviour when approached by the Claimant (hence his approach in the first place), and that Champ had never behaved in this way before. Also instructive was the fact that Champ had previously been in an incident with another dog where he had been attacked, but crucially had not retaliated, which was accepted. The Judge also relied on the initial assessments of Champ made when he was first taken into CDH’s custody, which highlighted that Champ had never displayed any aggressive tendencies, and the fact that he had been walked circa 150 times before this incident, without issue. Further, he accepted that CDH had no reason to know that Champ would act in that way, him having never behaved in that way before.

Whilst not referenced in the Judgment, it is important to note that the Claimant also did not produce any expert evidence to support his allegations under the Act and was simply relying upon the fact of the attack.

This was an interesting and complex case under the Act, apart from the usual complexities as introduced by the Act itself, but particularly owing to the facts that:

• The Claimant’s injuries were caused by, on the Defendant’s evidence, the Claimant punching Champ in order to rescue his own dog, rather than an injury being directly inflicted by Champ upon the Claimant whilst exhibiting a characteristic. Whilst this issue did not feature specifically in the Judgment owing to the above issues being decided in the Defendant’s favour, it is likely that it would also have seen the allegations dismissed.
• The characteristic relied upon was to be aggressive and/or to bite other dogs, which raised significant questions about whether that characteristic gave rise to a likelihood of damage and/or of its being severe with respect to injury to people.

Negligence

The Claimant’s residual claim in negligence was also dismissed, despite the Judge having expressed significant reservations about the actions of the volunteer at trial. Ultimately, the Judge concluded that the reasoning in Whippey v Jones (albeit not directly citing it, but it was referred to in Jonathan’s skeleton argument) was instructive. The Judge found, following detailed closing submissions and Jonathan’s skeleton argument, that the Defendant’s “Golden Rule” was a blanket policy designed to prevent any incident rather than just those which were reasonably foreseeable. The Judge accepted that to find CDH negligent because of a failure to follow its own policy, which was a very high standard, was not the same as the test in negligence. The Judge accepted that a fact-specific approach needed to be taken.

Whilst it was found that the volunteer did breach the “Golden Rule”, the Judge found that it was not negligent to have allowed two seemingly docile dogs to interact with each other. He found that there was no reason to think that Champ would behave as he did, and the volunteer had no reason to believe that Champ would behave in that way, and neither did CDH.

Whilst Champ was known to be excitable and bit his lead when excited to go for a walk, the Judge found that though careful assessment, monitoring, and general instructions, CDH had done all that was reasonably required to prevent any reasonably foreseeable harm. What Champ did was not, in his judgment, reasonably foreseeable.

Causation

Finally, the Judge also found that the Claimant had not satisfied the burden of proof that his injury was caused by the leads, and found as a fact that it was more likely to have been caused by the punching. In those circumstances, medical and factual causation could not be made out in any event.

Consequently, the claim was dismissed in its entirety.

Comment

This was a tricky case for CDH, who did not have the benefit of lay witness evidence from the volunteer who was directly involved in the accident, and a volunteer who admittedly had not done what they were supposed to do. However, CDH’s witness evidence and documentation was able to highlight and prove their assessment and monitoring of Champ, which was vitally important evidence on the day of trial. The contemporaneous records of the attack and Champ’s behaviour were crucial to the Judge’s decisions.

Further, CDH were able to focus on the lack of expert evidence supporting the contentions under the Animals Act, and a thorough review of the Claimant’s medical records and reports highlighted the key causation issue.

This case highlights generally the importance of being able to establish both the characteristic relied upon for s2(2)(b) of the Act (and the problems with establishing it without supportive expert evidence) and also Defendant’s knowledge for the purposes of s2(2)(c) (which the Claimant in this case could not).

Also importantly, it highlighted the key and important difference between a Defendant’s own internal policies and the standard of care as in negligence. The Judge reflected that, whilst the Defendant set itself a high standard for its dog walkers, in the absence of any reasonable foreseeability of harm that allowing the dog to be walked by a volunteer, and allowing Champ to interact with another dog, was not negligent. There was simply no foreseeable risk of harm to the Claimant.  The policy was designed to avoid any risk, not just that which was reasonably foreseeable. The reasoning in Whippey v Jones holds true, and the remote possibility of harm is not the same as that which is reasonably foreseeable. The Defendant setting itself a high standard cannot, in the writer’s view, make it more likely that it will be found to be negligent for someone not doing it.

Jonathan acted throughout this claim, from drafting the Defence to advising in conference, drafting a detailed skeleton argument and representing the Defendant at trial. Jonathan has a growing specialism in claims involving animals and accepts instructions from both Claimants and Defendants.